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Abstract
Cloud-based documents are inherently valuable, due to
the volume and nature of sensitive personal and business
content stored in them. Despite the importance of such
documents to Internet users, there are still large gaps in
the understanding of what cybercriminals do when they
illicitly get access to them by for example compromising
the account credentials they are associated with. In this
paper, we present a system able to monitor user activity
on Google spreadsheets. We populated 5 Google spread-
sheets with fake bank account details and fake funds
transfer links. Each spreadsheet was configured to re-
port details of accesses and clicks on links back to us.
To study how people interact with these spreadsheets in
case they are leaked, we posted unique links pointing to
the spreadsheets on a popular paste site. We then moni-
tored activity in the accounts for 72 days, and observed
165 accesses in total. We were able to observe inter-
esting modifications to these spreadsheets performed by
illicit accesses. For instance, we observed deletion of
some fake bank account information, in addition to in-
sults and warnings that some visitors entered in some of
the spreadsheets. Our preliminary results show that our
system can be used to shed light on cybercriminal behav-
ior with regards to leaked online documents.
1 Introduction
Many useful services are cloud-based nowadays, for ex-
ample Dropbox [1] and OneDrive [5] which are both file
storage services. Reasons for using cloud-based stor-
age services include ease of access to files stored in the
cloud and the ability to collaborate easily on shared files.
According to a study by Eurostat, 21% of EU citizens
stored documents and multimedia files in the cloud as
of 2014 [8]. Apart from individuals, many organizations
also rely heavily on cloud-based services for office du-
ties, such as Google Apps for Work [3], a cloud-based
suite that provides business tools like official email ad-
dresses, calendars, online storage space, and document
processing services.
Consequently, a considerable amount of valuable in-
formation is stored in online accounts, including sensi-
tive personal information and business secrets. These in
turn attract cybercriminals seeking to make profit from
such information. To gain access to such online ac-
counts, cybercriminals typically target owners of the ac-
counts with phishing attacks, and sometimes, malware.
Often, databases containing user credentials are also at-
tacked, and credentials in them get stolen.
Stolen credentials are usually sold by cybercriminals
in underground marketplaces, to other cybercriminals for
malicious purposes. Depending on the nature of the com-
promised accounts, some are used to send unsolicited
messages, and some are assessed by the cybercriminals
with the hope of finding other valuable information that
could be used to stage further attacks, either against the
victim, or the victim’s contacts. Such information of in-
terest to cybercriminals include contacts lists, financial
details and authentication credentials linked to other ac-
counts.
Previous work on compromised cloud-based accounts
is limited. They focus on malicious activity in compro-
mised webmail accounts, with emphasis on spearphish-
ing as a primary attack vector [10, 25]. It is hard for re-
searchers to collect data on compromised accounts be-
cause there are no existing publicly available systems
built for that purpose. To partially bridge this gap, we
develop a system based on Google Apps Script [6] to
monitor compromised online spreadsheets. Our system
is able to monitor activity performed by users on Google
spreadsheets, such as open events, modifications, and
clicks on links. Having visibility on these events is key
for researchers wanting to understand what is happening
to cloud documents once they are accessed by attackers.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our system to study
illicit accesses to online documents, we set up honey
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spreadsheets in Google Docs and populate them with
fake financial information. We also embed obfuscated
links in the spreadsheets, some pointing to a domain un-
der our control, others pointing to invalid pages on some
selected banks’ websites. We leak unique links pointing
to the spreadsheets on a popular paste site, after config-
uring each spreadsheet to allow anyone with the links
to edit the spreadsheets. We set up two scenarios on
why these spreadsheets could be posted on paste sites:
a user innocently sharing them with her colleagues, in-
advertently making it accessible to anyone on the Inter-
net, and a criminal posting a link to the spreadsheet after
having obtained illicit access to it. Compromised creden-
tials and other sensitive information are routinely posted
by cybercriminals on paste sites [26], so this scenario is
believable.
After posting the links, we monitor accesses to the
honey spreadsheets, and log interactions and activity in
them. We aim to answer the following research ques-
tions:
Question 1: What actions do attackers take on stolen
cloud-based documents? Can we identify typologies of
cybercriminals based on the actions they take in the doc-
uments?
Question 2: What kind of content do cybercriminals find
more attractive than others, within the same document?
What kind of content do they interact with more than
others?
Over a period of 72 days, we conducted two experi-
ments and observed 165 accesses, 28 modification events
and 174 clicks on the embedded obfuscated links. The
clicks originated from 35 different countries. The mod-
ifications we observed include deletion of fake payment
information, entry of insults into a spreadsheet, and de-
facement of the same spreadsheet, thus rendering it un-
usable.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We develop a novel system to track activity in
Google spreadsheets. The system is able to observe
file opening and modification of content, in addition
to tracking clicks on links contained in the spread-
sheets. The system also records IP addresses, re-
quest paths and HTTP headers for clicks on the em-
bedded links.
• We deployed 5 honey spreadsheets and leaked links
pointing to them on a popular paste site. We per-
form experiments for 72 days and measure accesses
to the spreadsheets. During the experiments, vis-
itors modified and deleted fake payment informa-
tion, expanded some columns in the spreadsheets
in order to get better views of the data in those
columns, and also replaced an obfuscated link in a
spreadsheet with a C++ code snippet.
• We discuss how our approach could be used to set
up different scenarios and give the research commu-
nity a better understanding of the modus operandi
of cybercriminals compromising stolen online doc-
uments.
2 Background
2.1 Cloud-based spreadsheets
As stated earlier, cloud-based accounts are popular
nowadays, and a large amount of documents particularly
are stored in cloud-based storage facilities. We focus
our study on Google spreadsheets, particularly on ac-
tions taken by cybercriminals when they compromise the
spreadsheets. We chose Google spreadsheets since the
Google platform offers scripting functionality that allows
us to boost the capability of the spreadsheets, to mon-
itor activity in them. Our methodology can be applied
to other cloud-based documents as well. In this section,
we summarize the capabilities that spreadsheets provide,
and focus on Google spreadsheets specifically.
When logged in to a Google account, users can
create a new spreadsheet, or import an existing one.
Each spreadsheet comprises cells arranged in rows and
columns. Users can delete existing rows and columns of
cells, move existing rows and columns around, and insert
new ones as well.
For purposes of collaboration, users can share spread-
sheets with other users usually by listing their email
addresses, or by sharing a unique link pointing to the
spreadsheet. Depending on permission settings specified
by the document owner, collaborators can have view-
only, comment-only, or edit access.
Spreadsheet owners can extend the functionality of
their spreadsheets by leveraging Google Apps Script [6],
a cloud-based Javascript engine for attaching scripts to
documents in Google Docs platform. The scripts may be
triggered by events such as opening of the spreadsheet
or modification of its contents. Such scripts may also be
triggered at some specified time intervals. Google Apps
Script is commonly used for development of minimal
web applications, in addition to extending the function-
ality of Gmail accounts and other Google products [6].
Google Apps Script can be configured to send out notifi-
cations when triggered, among other tasks.
2.2 Threat model
Cloud-based documents can get compromised in a num-
ber of ways. Cybercriminals mount phishing and
spearphishing attacks on online accounts; this is the
most common way by which cybercriminals manually
hijack online accounts, according to Bursztein et al. [10].
Information-stealing malware also capture login creden-
tials safeguarding online accounts, for instance after
drive-by downloads or clicking on spurious links and
attachments in emails. Attackers also compromise ac-
counts by hacking databases containing login creden-
tials.
Poor file access configuration, for example grant-
ing “allow-all” permissions, rather than specifying a
whitelist of permitted parties, can also expose online
documents to threats. Attackers have easy access if they
get hold of pointers to a file, for instance by eavesdrop-
ping on communications about shared files, and grabbing
links pointing to such files.
Attackers can also mount Man-in-the-Cloud attacks on
documents stored online, by stealing authentication to-
kens and impersonating legitimate parties that have ac-
cess to the compromised documents [9].
Previous work focused on what happens in webmail
accounts compromised via phishing attacks [10]. How-
ever, our work focuses on attacks on documents in the
cloud. Similarly, Stolfo et al. proposed a method of
mitigating insider threats to confidential data stored in
the cloud [21]. Their work, however, focuses on insider
threats, while we consider a broader threat model.
3 Methodology
Our aim was to gain insight into what attackers do after
gaining unauthorized access to leaked spreadsheets. To
achieve this, we developed a system based on Google
Apps Script [6] to monitor events performed by users
on Google spreadsheets, such as accesses, modifications,
and click on links. We then set up experiments in which
we created five Google spreadsheets and added honey
URLs in them, some pointing to a domain under our
control, others pointing to non-existent bank pages. Fig-
ure 1 shows an overview of the honeypot infrastructure
we set up, to monitor accesses to the honey spreadsheets.
We leaked links pointing to the honey spreadsheets on
pastebin.com [7], a popular paste site. The idea is to
observe what captures the attention of attackers, and how
they interact with the spreadsheets.
3.1 Honey spreadsheets
We set up a Google account and created five spreadsheets
in it. The spreadsheets were populated with randomly
selected names and fake bank account details, including
fake International Bank Account Numbers (IBANs), sort
codes, and links masquerading as funds transfer pointers
apparently connected to some of the fake accounts. Some
of the links point to a domain under our control. The
idea is to log attempts made by cybercriminals to transfer
Figure 1: A simplified overview of our honeypot in-
frastructure. Visitors interact with honey spreadsheets,
and information about their actions is sent to the web-
mail account that receives notifications. If certain
links in the spreadsheets are clicked, our modified web
server receives the generated HTTP requests, logs in-
formation about the requests, and redirects them to
google.com [2]. We also monitor clicks on all em-
bedded links through Google Analytics, since we used
Google’s URL shortener to obfuscate those links before
inserting them in the honey spreadsheets.
funds out of the non-existent honey accounts. One of the
honey spreadsheets is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: A partial view of a leaked honey spreadsheet,
containing fake payroll information. Note that shortened
URLs are also in the same spreadsheet, but not shown
here.
On creating a spreadsheet on the Google Docs plat-
form, a unique link is generated by Google. Anyone
with the link can thus access the spreadsheet, either with
read-only permission or edit permission, depending on
the access settings in the spreadsheet. We configured
each spreadsheet to grant edit permission to anyone in
possession of its unique link. In addition, the spread-
sheets were instrumented with scripts to monitor activity,
for instance, file open and edit events. The hidden scripts
report those events back to us by sending email notifica-
tions to a webmail account under our control. The scripts
were implemented in Google Apps Script [6].
Our monitoring scripts periodically take snapshots of
the honey spreadsheets, and send notification messages
about those snapshots to a webmail account under our
control. Information contained in the notifications in-
clude modified content, changes in spreadsheet structure,
the date and time that the spreadsheet was last accessed,
and date and time that the spreadsheet was last updated.
We periodically retrieve and collate notifications from
the webmail account, and parse them locally.
We set up an experiment involving spreadsheets whose
URLs are posted on public paste sites. This experiment
shows the usefulness of our system, and we believe that
our approach will be helpful in future related work on the
behavior of cybercriminals that compromise documents
stored in the cloud. In Section 5 we explore additional
experiments that could be performed to further under-
stand the ecosystem around stolen online documents.
Honey links: One of our goals was to observe if cy-
bercriminals would attempt to observe or tamper directly
with any of the honey bank accounts listed in the pay-
roll. To achieve this, we did the following: In each honey
spreadsheet, we inserted 9 URLs, 3 of them pointing to a
domain under our control, and the remaining 6 pointing
to non-existent bank pages. Each URL was shortened
and obfuscated using goo.gl [4], an online URL short-
ener. The idea is that all clicks on the embedded links
would be logged by Google Analytics platform, which
monitors URLs that were shortened using goo.gl [4],
and clicks on the 3 links pointing to our web server would
be logged by the web server. Figure 3 shows the honey
URLs we embedded in the honey spreadsheets.
Figure 3: Honey links embedded in leaked honey spread-
sheet. The URLs were obfuscated using a URL short-
ener, and some of them point to a web server under our
control.
3.2 Monitoring the spreadsheets
In addition to tracking changes in the honey spreadsheets
using Google Apps Script, we incorporated honey links
in each spreadsheet. As earlier stated, the idea is to track
attempts by cybercriminals to stage further attacks on the
honey accounts listed in the spreadsheets. Some of the
embedded honey links point to a domain under our con-
trol, and clicks on those ones generate HTTP requests to
a web server under our control.
We configured the web server to redirect all incom-
ing requests to google.com [2], and log details such as
the visitor’s IP address, originating port number, HTTP
header details, request paths, and timestamps of ac-
cesses. The purpose of the web server is to deflect the
attention of visitors from our honeypot infrastructure,
while logging accesses simultaneously.
We periodically run another script that connects to the
webmail account that receives email notifications from
the honey spreadsheets, to retrieve those notifications
through the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP).
This enables us to parse and analyse the notifications of-
fline.
Links pointing to the honey spreadsheets were leaked
on pastebin.com [7], to entice attackers to interact with
the honey sheets. We set up two experiments: in the
first one, we pretended to be the legitimate owner of the
spreadsheet, sharing it with a colleague without realizing
that this would make it accessible to the entire Internet.
In the second experiment we presented to be a criminal
who got illicit access to the spreadsheet and posted in on
the paste sites to brag. Our experiments ran for 72 days.
3.3 Ethics
Our experiments involve deceiving potential cybercrim-
inals into interacting with fake spreadsheets containing
fake financial information. We made sure that all infor-
mation in the spreadsheets were not related to any real
financial account. To mitigate the possibility of misuse
of the online account hosting the honey spreadsheets, we
did not leak credentials of the account, thus ensuring we
remained in full control of the account throughout the ex-
periments. Finally, to ensure that our experiments were
run in an ethical manner, we sought and obtained per-
mission from our institution’s ethics committee, under
project number 6521/001.
4 Results
In this section, we discuss the activity observed in honey
spreadsheets as part of our experiment. We also provide
details of accesses to the modified web server under our
control, and Google Analytics data we obtained from the
shortened URLs we embedded in the spreadsheets.
4.1 Overview
Over the period of evaluation (72 days), we conducted
two experiments with the honey sheets, with two main
leak message themes. During the first experiment, we
pretended to be a hacker that discovered some corporate
financial information. For instance, we leaked messages
like “leaked corporate payments” and “st0len payrolls”
along with unique links pointing to the spreadsheets. In
the second experiment, we pretended to be a naive person
sharing financial information with a colleague, and inad-
vertently leaking such information. In this case, the leak
messages were of the form “Bob, here is the spreadsheet
with payrolls for September.” The idea was to identify
the leak message theme that would generate more inter-
est in the honey sheets.
The first experiment, in which we pretended to be a
hacker, was conducted from 23rd January 2016 till 8th
March 2016 (46 days), during which links to the honey
sheets were leaked twice daily. The second experiment,
in which we pretended to naively share links with a col-
league, was carried out from 9th March 2016 till 3rd
April 2016 (26 days). Similarly, we shared unique links
pointing to the honey sheets twice daily.
4.2 Activity on honey spreadsheets
For each leaked honey spreadsheet, we recorded file open
events and file modification events. File open events are
triggered when a honey spreadsheet is opened by visit-
ing the unique URL pointing to it, while modification
events are triggered when the structure of the spread-
sheet is changed by the person accessing it. Modifica-
tion events are also triggered when the contents of the
spreadsheet are changed. We recorded snapshots of each
spreadsheet every two hours, and compared those snap-
shots over time, to monitor the values that were modified
in the spreadsheets.
In the first experiment, during which we pretended
to be a hacker leaking financial information, we ob-
served 112 file open events and 17 modification events
over a period of 46 days. In the second experiment, in
which we posed as a naive user, we observed 53 file
open events and 11 modification events over 26 days.
We could not identify significant statistical differences
between the two experiments with regards to file open
and modification events. The dataset containing the de-
tails of the open and modification events is available
at http://dx.doi.org/10.14324/000.ds.1502241.
We acknowledge the possibility that some visitors may
make copies of the spreadsheets for offline viewing and
modification. This is one of the limiting factors in the
experiments.
Interesting modification events. We observed some in-
teresting modification events among the 28 recorded dur-
ing our experiments. In one of the honey spreadsheets,
one of the bank account numbers was deleted, and the
spreadsheet itself was rendered unusable. The attacker
changed font sizes and colors, along with background
colors in the spreadsheet, and replaced all the embedded
honey links with the short URL https://goo.gl/ufniSo.
The short URL redirects to a Google search page for
“minions.” In addition, the word ‘\MINIONSXDDDD’
was written on the spreadsheet, while an insult was en-
tered in the spreadsheet. Interestingly, it appears the at-
tacker did not click on any of the embedded honey links.
This case study shows that our honey spreadsheet infras-
tructure could be used to study trolling, cyber bullying,
and hate speech behavior on the web.
In another case, we observed a number of spreadsheet
modifications that brought about no change in the con-
tent of the affected honey spreadsheets. A closer look
revealed that the viewers expanded some columns, espe-
cially the ones containing fake payment links for funds
transfer, presumably to have a better view of the URLs
there.
4.3 Activity on embedded honey links
We observed 39 unique IP addresses that visited the 3
links pointing to our web server, and a total of 44 visits
to those 3 links. We recorded accesses from 35 different
countries, and a total of 174 clicks on all the 9 embed-
ded honey links. Those clicks originated from the fol-
lowing browsers: Chrome, Firefox, Safari, and Samsung
browsers, on devices running Windows, Linux, Macin-
tosh, and Android operating systems.
Location of accesses. In order to have an idea of the
locations of visitors accessing the honey spreadsheets,
we extracted country information from Google Analyt-
ics dashboard, and also performed geolocation on IP ad-
dresses recorded by our web server. We plotted the loca-
tions on a world map, as shown in Figure 4.
5 Discussion
In this section, we mention the limitations that we en-
countered during the experiments, and discuss some ad-
ditional experiments that could be performed using our
infrastructure to better understand the modus operandi
of attackers and cybercriminals illicitly accessing cloud
documents.
Limitations. We were able to leak the spreadsheets only
on a paste site (and not, for example, on an underground
forum), implying that visitors accessing the spreadsheets
are likely unsophisticated cybercriminals or just curious
users. This is further emphasized by the fact that the
visitors did not appear to make much effort to cover up
their accesses.
Attackers could make copies of the honey spread-
sheets and explore them offline. We would be unable
to monitor what they do with the spreadsheets offline,
unless they click on the embedded honey links.
Figure 4: Location of visits to the embedded honey links.
In Google spreadsheets, there are limitations on the
functionality of Google Apps Script for users that are not
logged in. Since visitors are not required to login before
interacting with the spreadsheets, there are limits on the
amount of information we can collect on the visitors, and
also how much activity we can monitor in the spread-
sheets. This is an intrinsic limitation of our monitoring
infrastructure.
Future work. In the future, we plan to continue studying
the modus operandi of cybercriminals interacting with
compromised online documents, and the underground
economy surrounding them. We intend to instrument
more documents, and leak documents containing honey
credentials linked to honey web services. The idea is that
cybercriminals would attempt to log in to those honey
web services using the honey credentials, and this hope-
fully would be a good way to distinguish between merely
curious visitors and cybercriminals. As a result, leaking
credentials in honey documents would give us broader
visibility into their modus operandi. We also plan to leak
documents to more sites (for instance, through malware
and underground forums), and study differences in ac-
cesses across different leak sites. We could modify the
existing monitoring infrastructure we have developed to
other online document storage platforms. We also plan
to devise a taxonomy of attackers targeting online cloud
documents. Finally, we intend to study online trolling
and hate speech further, having discovered that our honey
documents attract insults and destructive action (defac-
ing).
6 Related Work
Honeypots have proved to be useful in cyber security
studies, for instance, in the analysis of malware be-
haviour in controlled environments, tracking of insider
threats in organizations, and understanding cybercrimi-
nal schemes. In general, resources created with the sole
purpose of being misused by cybercriminals to enable re-
searchers to learn their modus operandi are referred to as
honeytokens. In this section, we compare our work with
previous studies.
Applications of honeytokens to security. Liu et al. [15]
studied the problem of privacy in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) net-
works, using honey files. Similarly, Salem et al. [18]
and Spitzner [20] proposed the use of decoy documents
to track attackers, mitigate insider threats, and detect in-
truders [27]. Unlike those studies, we consider docu-
ments stored in the cloud instead of documents stored
locally. In 2012, Sobesto et al. [19] studied the impact of
computer configuration on computer-focused attacks, by
deploying honeypot machines and allowing brute-force
attackers to “break” into them via SSH. Unlike our work,
they do not study compromised online documents. Niki-
forakis et al. [16] used honey files to expose privacy leaks
and abuse on file hosting services. Kapravelos et al. [13]
used honey web pages to study privacy invasive and mali-
cious browser extensions on Google Chrome. De Cristo-
faro et al. [11] created a Facebook page for a fake com-
pany on Facebook, with the goal of studying the fake
likes that it would receive. Nikiforakis et al. [17] dis-
played fake advertisements on ad-based URL shorten-
ing services, with the goal of exposing their privacy and
security issues. A handful of papers [14, 24] deployed
honey profiles on online social networks to identify ac-
counts operated by spammers. Stringhini et al. [23]
identified various actors in the email spam ecosystem,
and their interrelationships, by leaking honey email ad-
dresses and monitoring spam emails received by them. In
this paper we looked at honey Google Documents, with
the goal of understanding the activity of malicious users
on such documents.
Studies on compromised accounts and credentials.
Stone-Gross et al. [22] investigated the Pushdo/Cutwail
botnet, and discovered that cybercriminals were selling
online account information in underground forums. We
used a similar approach to leak links pointing to honey
spreadsheets on public paste sites. Bursztein et al. [10]
studied account activity in Gmail accounts that were
compromised mostly through phishing pages. In con-
trast to Bursztein et al. [10], this paper focuses on ac-
tivity in Google spreadsheets, rather than on Gmail ac-
counts. Egele et al. [12] studied the problem of compro-
mised online social network accounts, developing behav-
ioral models to detect and block these compromises. We
believe that the activity of hijackers on honey documents
will be significantly different than the one from their le-
gitimate owners. For these reasons, similar techniques
to detect compromises could be applied to the context of
honey documents as well.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a honey spreadsheet system
able to monitor the activity of cybercriminals interact-
ing with compromised Google spreadsheets. We set up
5 honey spreadsheets, populated with fake financial data,
and leaked them on a paste site. Prior to leaking them, we
embed 9 honey links in each spreadsheet, to track poten-
tial attempts to mount attacks against the fake financial
accounts in the spreadsheets. We observed accesses to
the spreadsheets, and attempts by visitors to access some
honey links embedded in the spreadsheets, for a period
of 72 days. We present preliminary results of the exper-
iments and highlight how our method may be useful in
studying malicious activity in online documents, in gen-
eral.
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